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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-4445 
____________ 
 
JOHN HAWK-BEY, 
    Appellant 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-11-cv-06297) 
District Judge: C. Darnell Jones, III 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted on a Motion for Summary Affirmance 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 12, 2012 
Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER  and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 20, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
 Appellant John Hawk-Bey filed a civil action in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the United States of 
America.  Hawk-Bey alleged that the federal district court had jurisdiction, 
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pursuant to the Emancipation Proclamation of 1862 and the Fifth Amendment, to 
hear his complaint that President Obama, Attorney General Eric Holder, and 
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner had denied “the effort he was making for his 
actual freedom through his Job Creation and Restoration Plan . . . and through his 
Emergency Colonization Request . . . and through his Tax Exempt Request.”  
Hawk-Bey requested “$41 billion in tax free monetary compensation.”  The 
Government moved to dismiss the complaint, and, in an order entered on 
November 15, 2011, the District Court granted the motion as unopposed.  In the 
margin, the court also determined that the complaint failed to comply with Fed. R. 
Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and 
that the allegations in the complaint concerned only nonjusticiable political 
questions. 
 Hawk-Bey appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  After 
Hawk-Bey filed his informal brief, the Government moved to summarily affirm the 
order of District Court dismissing Hawk-Bey’s complaint.  We have considered 
Hawk-Bey’s informal brief and his response in opposition to the Government’s 
motion to summarily affirm. 
We will grant the Government’s motion and summarily affirm the order of 
the District Court because no substantial question is presented by this appeal, Third 
Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  We exercise plenary review over Rule 12(b)(1) 
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and (6) dismissals.  See In re: Kaiser Group International Inc., 399 F.3d 558, 560 
(3d Cir. 2005) (Rule 12(b)(1)); Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 
2001) (Rule 12(b)(6)).  We “are free” to affirm the judgment “on any basis which 
finds support in the record.”  Bernitsky v. United States, 620 F.2d 948, 950 (3d Cir. 
1980).   
According to items he submitted in the District Court and again on appeal, 
Hawk-Bey wrote to President Obama with his idea for injecting $9 billion into the 
economy by paying that same amount of money to the descendants of Africans 
who were held as slaves in the nineteenth century.  In addition, he noted his 
consent, given to President Obama and Attorney General Holder, to be 
“colonized,” as discussed in the Emancipation Proclamation, which has yet to be 
executed in accordance with his wishes, and he noted his request for tax exempt 
status under the Emancipation Proclamation.  We conclude that, to the extent that 
Hawk-Bey refers to President Obama, reparations, and the Job Creation and 
Restoration Plan, to Attorney General Holder and an Emergency Colonization 
Request, and to Secretary Geithner and a Tax Exemption Request, his complaint 
presents political questions which the federal courts do not address.   
Under Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution, a federal court 
cannot adjudicate a constitutional matter except “as it is called upon to adjudge the 
legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.”  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
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204 (1962) (quoting Liverpool Steamship Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 
113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).  The Constitution recognizes a separation of powers with 
respect to the three branches of government such that political questions are not 
justifiable.  The Supreme Court has explained that: 
[I]t is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate 
branches of the Federal Government, ... which gives rise to the 
“political question.”  We have said that in determining whether a 
question falls within the political question category, the 
appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality 
to the action of the political departments and also the lack of 
satisfying criteria for a judicial determination are dominant 
considerations.  The nonjusticiability of a political question is 
primarily a function of the separation of powers. 
 
369 U.S. at 210 (internal quotation marks, parentheses, and citation omitted).   
Accordingly, Hawk-Bey lacks standing to bring his claims because the 
matters he raises have “in any measure been committed by the Constitution to 
another branch of government.”  Id. at 211.  To the extent that his complaint does 
not present only political questions, the District Court properly dismissed it under 
Rule 8(a)(2) because Hawk-Bey failed to comply with the requirement of “a short 
and plain statement  . . .  showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District 
Court, dismissing the complaint.  Appellant’s motion to suspend court rules, etc. is 
denied.  
